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Abstract—This paper is a short summary of a real world 
mirroring attack on the Apple iPhone 5c passcode retry 
counter under iOS 9. This was achieved by desoldering the 
NAND Flash chip of a sample phone in order to physically 
access its connection to the SoC and partially reverse 
engineering its proprietary bus protocol. The process does 
not require any expensive and sophisticated equipment. All 
needed parts are low cost and were obtained from local 
electronics distributors. By using the described and 
successful hardware mirroring process it was possible to 
bypass the limit on passcode retry attempts. This is the first 
public demonstration of the working prototype and the real 
hardware mirroring process for iPhone 5c. Although the 
process can be improved, it is still a successful proof-of-
concept project. Knowledge of the possibility of mirroring 
will definitely help in designing systems with better 
protection. Also some reliability issues related to the NAND 
memory allocation in iPhone 5c are revealed. Some future 
research directions are outlined in this paper and several 
possible countermeasures are suggested. We show that 
claims that iPhone 5c NAND mirroring was infeasible were 
ill-advised. 
Keywords: Apple iPhone 5c; NAND Flash memory; 
mirroring attack; hardware security 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile phones, and in particular smart phones, can 
contain a large amount of personal information: contact 
history, text messages, location history, access-credentials 
to online services, financial details, etc. It is therefore 
hardly surprising that the forensic examination of mobile-
device storage has become a significant line of enquiry in 
many police investigations, and forces around the world 
operate large laboratories to routinely retrieve and analyze 
data from the phones of both suspects and victims. At the 
same time, smartphones are evolving into personal security 
devices used for financial transactions, with associated 
user expectations about their physical security. Mobile 
phone vendors, most notably Apple Inc., have responded 
by encrypting data stored in non-volatile memory, in order 
to protect personal data and access credentials against 
unauthorized recovery of from lost or stolen devices. 
Data mirroring is widely used in computer storage 
when higher reliability of data storage is required. This is a 
process of copying data from one location to a storage 
device in real time. As a result the information stored from 
the original location is always an exact copy of the original 
data. Data mirroring is useful in recovery of critical data 
after a disaster. In computer systems mirroring can be 
implemented as a part of standard RAID (redundant array 
of independent disks) levels [1]. From the hardware 
security prospective the process of mirroring could pose a 
threat as it creates a backup copy of the data that might 
allow restoring the previous state of the system, for 
example, with a higher value of password retry counter. 
The Apple iPhone 5c went under the spotlight soon 
after FBI recovered one from a terrorist suspect in 
December 2015 [2]. In February 2016 the FBI announced 
that it was unable to unlock the recovered phone due to its 
advanced security features, including encryption of user 
data [3]. The FBI first asked the NSA to break into the 
phone, but they were unable to [4]. As a result, the FBI 
asked Apple Inc. to create a new version of the phone's 
iOS operating system that could be installed and run in the 
phone's random access memory to disable certain security 
features. Apple refers to this as "GovtOS". Apple declined 
due to its policy to never undermine the security features 
of its products. The FBI responded by successfully 
applying to a United States magistrate judge, Sherri Pym, 
to issue a court order, mandating Apple to create and 
provide the requested software [5]. Less than 24 hours 
before a highly anticipated hearing over access to the 
phone was set to begin, Justice Department lawyers 
requested a delay [6]. Later in March the Justice 
Department has abandoned its bid to force Apple to help it 
unlock the iPhone saying that they had “now successfully 
accessed the data” stored on the iPhone in question [7]. 
At a press conference on 24 March 2016 FBI Director 
James Comey told reporters that “NAND mirroring” will 
not be used to get into the terrorist's iPhone 5c, saying “It 
doesn't work” [8,9]. 
NAND mirroring was suggested by several technology 
experts as the most likely way to gain unlimited passcode 
attempts in iPhone 5c. iPhone forensics expert Jonathan 
Zdziarski has demonstrated a software-based proof-of-
concept of mirroring attack using  jailbroken iPhone 5c. 
Although he did it with a jailbreak, he noted that “no 
jailbreak is needed to do this”, “as the FBI would be 
physically removing the NAND to copy this data”. The 
FBI Director Comey was not pleased about the piece by 
saying: “You are simply wrong to assert that the FBI and 
the Justice Department lied about our ability to access the 
San Bernardino killer’s phone” [10]. 
So far no one has demonstrated a fully working 
hardware-based NAND mirroring attack on iPhone 5c. 
Therefore, this paper is aimed at demonstrating the 
feasibility of such a process. Although it does not require 
expensive equipment there were several unexpected traps, 
pitfalls and obstacles on the way to full success. Most of 
these challenges are described in this paper. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a 
brief introduction into iPhone 5c hardware and NAND 
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memory. Section 3 introduces the preparation part, while 
Section 4 sets out the results. Section 5 discusses 
limitations and Section 6 possible improvements. The 
impact of the research is discussed in the concluding 
section. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The underlying security of iOS based devices including 
iPhone 5c is described in the Apple iOS Security guide 
[11]. Some forensics experts describe the differences 
between different versions of devices, for example, the 
encryption key management in iOS is presented in 
Figure 1 [12]. The user's passcode together with each 
device's unique UID key are used to calculate the Passcode 
key which unlocks the “System Keybag”. That way if you 
change the passcode it is not necessary to re-encrypt all the 
user data but only a small portion of stored keys. The UID 
key is hard coded into the main SoC (system-on-chip) and 
is the part of the CPU hardware security engine. This UID 
key is not accessible to the running code, so it is 
impossible to brute-force the Passcode key without the 
matching SoC hardware being involved in the process. 
 
Figure 1.  Block diagram of iOS encryption (Andrey Belenko [12]) 
If the security is enabled, then on powering up or 
waking up the iPhone asks for passcode (Figure 2). After 5 
consecutive incorrect attempts a short waiting time of 
about 5 seconds is introduced; after the next incorrect 
attempt the time is increased to 1 minute; then 5 minutes; 
then 15 minutes and finally 60 minutes. There is an option 
to permanently delete all the data after 10 consecutive 
incorrect attempts. 
Although information about iPhone 5c hardware is 
supposed to be secret, it can still be found on various 
related forums. This includes the layout of the main board 
as well as the circuit diagram or schematic and the bill of 
materials [13]. This significantly reduces the time 
otherwise required to locate important components such as 
A6 SoC and NAND. The pinout of the NAND chip is 
clearly outlined; however, some VCCQ and GND pins 
were swapped, thus simply following the circuit diagram 
could permanently damage the NAND chip. Flash memory 
devices in the LGA60 package [14] are not documented by 
any NAND chip manufacturers. Although present in their 
catalogs it was not possible to find any kind of 
documentation or datasheets on these particular NAND 
chips. This means that all the protocols and commands 
have to be learned by eavesdropping on the hardware 
interface using an oscilloscope or logic analyzer. 
 
Figure 2.  iPhone 5c passcode security 
There are two major types of Flash memory – NOR 
and NAND [15]. In a NOR structure, memory cells are 
connected in a parallel manner, while in NAND the cells 
are connected in series which reduces the cell size. Also 
the highly regular NAND structure allows a much smaller 
fabrication process – 14nm versus 28nm for NOR. In 
addition, some NAND cells can store two or even three 
bits of information per cell. Such Flash devices are called 
MLC and TLC. The data transfer rate is also much higher 
than NOR. This makes this memory type the leader in 
high-density storage applications. However, NAND Flash 
memory has some drawbacks. First is the higher number of 
faulty cells which require external error correction. To help 
with that, NAND memory allocates additional space for 
error correction data. Second is the limited number of 
rewrites – usually tens of thousands versus hundreds of 
thousands for NOR. Also, NAND memory has a 
significant latency for accessing random memory blocks 
because the storage array is accessed sequentially. 
Unlike magnetic media, which can be overwritten on 
the fly, Flash memory storage needs to be erased first 
before writing any new data. For example, SK hynix 64Gb 
(8G bytes) NAND Flash can be programmed in pages of 
16384 data bytes plus 1280 error correction bytes [16]. 
However, it can only be erased in blocks of 256 pages or 
4MB. 
If some pages or blocks in NAND memory are no 
longer functional they have to be either replaced with fresh 
pages/blocks or marked as unusable. This can be achieved 
at the hardware level with a dedicated NAND memory 
controller, or done in software – either by the NAND 
memory driver or by the OS. 
According to some sources, starting from iPhone 4 
models, Apple started using a new type of NAND memory 
devices, called PPN (Perfect Page New) [17]. They use a 
dedicated memory controller that performs ECC (error 
code correction) on the fly thus reducing the load on the 
main SoC chip. This was achieved by acquiring the ECC 
controller manufacturer Anobit in 2011 [18]. Since then, 
four large NAND manufacturers Toshiba, SK hynix, 
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Samsung and SanDisk started production and supply of the 
new type of NAND memory devices in new LGA60 
packages with custom interfaces. 
Flash memory devices use different communication 
interfaces. They could be either serial or parallel. 
However, even serial SPI interface, could simultaneously 
run two or four data lines to increase the communication 
speed. Most NAND devices have a parallel interface with 
8-bit or 16-bit width. Modern chips use DDR clocking to 
double the transfer rate, while some of them benefit from 
having more than one channel running in parallel. This not 
only increases the communication speed, but also allows 
erasing and writing in parallel. There is a standard agreed 
between all major NAND manufacturers called ONFi [19]. 
It outlines the electrical signals and specification as well as 
protocols and commands. As a first step in iPhone 5c 
NAND analysis it is necessary to check if the commands 
used for its NAND are the same as in the ONFi 
specification. There is another standard for parallel NAND 
Flash devices called eMMC [20]. It benefits from the 
embedded ECC controller and has a simpler interface 
compared to standard NAND. 
III. PREPARATION FOR MIRRORING 
iPhone 5c devices are no longer manufactured, so 
samples for the hardware mirroring experiments were 
obtained on Ebay. Only two were fully functioning; the 
non-functioning ones were used as a test bench to verify 
ideas and finalize the best approaches. The fully functional 
phones were also updated to the latest 9.3 version of iOS. 
A. TAKING IPHONE 5C APART 
The teardown process of disassembling iPhone 5c is 
well described on the Internet with the iFixit web page 
probably being the best known [21]. After taking off the 
screen, unplugging all the connectors and carefully 
removing all the screws that hold the main board, it can be 
dismantled and taken off the frame. The image of the main 
board from both sides is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.  iPhone 5c main board 
The next step is to gain access to the on-board 
components, in particular the NAND memory storage. 
Some shields need to be removed by desoldering them 
with a hot air gun. This exposes the A6 SoC chip on one 
side and the NAND chip on the other side (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4.  iPhone 5c opening for SoC and NAND 
The NAND chip was not only soldered in its LGA 
leadless package but also glued using a strong epoxy 
compound. The gap between the NAND bottom side and 
the main PCB of merely 0.05mm makes the removal 
process quite a challenging task. Unless properly planned 
and supported by special thin blade knife tools this could 
damage both the NAND and the main PCB. To remove the 
NAND a temperature above 300 ºC is required due to 
heavy heat sinking of the main PCB. Although the 
surrounding epoxy becomes softer it still sticks to the 
nearby small components (capacitors, inductors etc.) and is 
likely to pull them off the main PCB, thus making it stop 
working. To avoid damage to other components, the epoxy 
was weakened along the perimeter of the NAND package 
with a Nichrome wire heated to about 700ºC by an electric 
current. Also small components around the NAND 
package were reinforced with high-temperature epoxy 
compound (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5.  iPhone 5c NAND preparation 
The process of removing the NAND chip started with 
fixing the main board in a holding frame. Then the whole 
board was preheated to about 150ºC before heating up the 
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NAND package with 330ºC hot air. A thin-blade knife was 
used to slowly and carefully separate the NAND from the 
main board. The result is shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6.  iPhone 5c with removed NAND 
Using high temperature air for desoldering the NAND 
chip should not cause any loss of data. Previous research 
demonstrated that Flash memory will sustain heating to 
temperatures as high as 400ºC for over ten minutes without 
any sign of degradation [22]. 
B. WIRING NAND MEMORY 
The next step was to check if the main board and 
NAND had survived the desoldering operation and still 
were fully functional. For that all the connected pads on 
the NAND package were connected to the corresponding 
pads on the main board using thin 0.3mm PTFE wires 
(Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7.  iPhone 5c with wired up NAND 
In order to test the result a hole was cut in the phone's 
frame as well as in the metal shield (Figure 8). Then both 
shields were soldered back to the main board before finally 
assembling the phone. 
Once the phone was powered up the Apple logo 
initially appeared thus indicating that the NAND memory 
is functioning and the electrical connections are correct. 
Unfortunately, after 10 seconds it disappeared and then the 
boot process started over again. A quick look at the signals 
with an oscilloscope revealed that the power lines were not 
coping with the peak current during fast DDR 
communication. Therefore, several bypass capacitors were 
installed directly on all power pads of the NAND package. 
However, the NAND contents was already corrupted and 
the phone was still crashing after about 10 seconds into the 
boot process. Any attempts to force the iPhone into 
recovery mode, so that the NAND Flash can be reinstated, 
using iTunes were unsuccessful. The solution came with 
hard wiring both HRESET and FORCE_DFU signals off 
the SoC chip, by soldering thin wires to the corresponding 
pads on the main PCB and using switches to control those 
signals (Figure 9). HRESET signal is activated with a low 
logic level, but FORCE_DFU signal requires a higher 
voltage of 3V to be enforced. This was figured out by 
measuring the protection diodes between the power lines 
and the signals. 
 
Figure 8.  iPhone 5c prepared for assembling 
 
Figure 9.  iPhone 5c with hardware DFU forcing 
After restoring the phone to its factory settings using 
iTunes and making sure that all functions work correctly, it 
was possible to continue the experiments. In order to assist 
with signal analysis, the NAND was wired to a small 0.05” 
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connector, while the matching connector was soldered to a 
prototype PCB and wired to the main board of the iPhone 
5c (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10.  iPhone 5c with NAND on connector 
Unfortunately, the phone did not work reliably with the 
NAND on a connector and was often crashing during the 
boot process, while any attempts to restore it with iTunes 
resulted with “An unknown error occurred (14)”. Again an 
oscilloscope helped in finding that the communication 
signals were severely distorted because of the parasitic 
capacitance and inductance caused by the long wires 
(Figure 11). The top waveform is the source at the SoC 
side, while the bottom one shows the NAND side. The 
overshoot for 1.8V CMOS logic signal was +1.1V and the 
undershoot signal was −0.9V. This was a serious problem 
especially for clocking signals such as RE, WE and DQS, 
because the ringing was causing unwanted data latching. 
 
Figure 11.  iPhone 5c signals at SoC and NAND pads 
The problem was solved with insertion of small 
termination resistors into all signal lines. The resulting 
signal is presented in Figure 12. Only a small delay of 
0.12ns was introduced as a result. 
This again made the phone work perfectly and it was 
ready for the next step – of eavesdropping on the 
communication protocol and commands. 
 
Figure 12.  iPhone 5c signals after termination 
C. EAVESDROPPING ON NAND COMMUNICATION 
In order to reliably eavesdrop on the communication an 
intermediate prototype PCB board was built with buffers 
(Figure 13). That way both an oscilloscope and logic 
analyzer probes can be used for signal acquisitions without 
fear of overloading the NAND communication signals 
with the high capacitance and low resistance of the probe 
leads. 
 
Figure 13.  iPhone 5c with intermediate board for eavesdropping 
Unfortunately, once again the signal integrity problem 
was encountered. This time it was caused by the input and 
output capacitance of the buffer elements. Standard digital 
CMOS logic of 74LVC and 74AVC series introduces a 
capacitance load in the region of 4pF to 6pF. This in 
combination with the inductance of the wires caused 
excessive delays and ringing in the signal lines. The only 
solution was to choose a logic with lower capacitance, 
such as the 74AUP and 74AXP series. However, by the 
time the capacitive load problem was solved, the NAND 
contents was corrupted beyond the iTunes capability to 
restore the iPhone with “An unknown error occurred 
(4013)” being reported all the time. The solution was again 
hardware-based. By carefully adjusting the delay on the 
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RE line with an RC chain (Figure 14), it was possible to 
trick iTunes into thinking that the NAND storage is 
partially corrupted and force restoring both the LLB and 
iBoot partitions. 
 
Figure 14.  iPhone 5c with RC delay line for NAND 
Finally the iPhone 5c was ready for examination of the 
protocols and commands during its boot process as well as 
during normal operation. 
 
Figure 15.  iPhone 5c with logic analyzer 
The signal analysis with an oscilloscope revealed that 
the iPhone 5c uses different interfaces and commands at 
different stages of the boot process. At the very beginning 
it reads pages using ONFi compliant commands at a 
relatively low speed of 17MHz, then it switches to 
undocumented proprietary commands with 50MHz 
clocking. The iOS is loaded with a DDR clock of 128MHz 
thus achieving a peak throughput of above 250MB/s. The 
particular SK hynix H2JTCG8T21BMR 8GB NAND chip 
used in a sample phone has only one communication bus. 
NAND chips from other manufacturers use two buses and 
will require two sockets for mirroring. 
A logic analyzer was used to record all the commands 
and work out the proprietary custom protocol used for the 
NAND communication in iPhone 5c (Figure 15). 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF MIRRORING 
The next step was to implement all the necessary 
commands to support reading, erasing and writing of the 
Flash memory in a separate setup controlled by a PC via a 
serial port. 
A. PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION 
In order to debug all the custom commands used for 
NAND communication a simple adapter cable was made 
for plugging the intermediate board with the NAND chip 
into a self-made universal IC programmer (Figure 16). 
 
Figure 16.  Evaluation of NAND in IC programmer 
 
Figure 17.  iPhone 5c NAND reading software 
All the signals were replicated with a slower 
communication speed of 1MHz using the C programming 
language. This helped a lot in understanding the layout of 
the memory. For 8GB storage there are two planes each 
containing 1064 blocks. Erase operation can only be 
applied to blocks. Each block contains 256 pages and the 
writing is done in pages. Each page contains 16448 bytes 
of information. This information is grouped in four sectors 
of 4096 bytes of data and 16 bytes of indexing. It can be 
seen in Figure 17 that the ASCII text is interrupted with 16 
bytes of binary data from 0x3430 to 0x343F. Very likely 
the indexing is used to mark the logical mapping of the 
data for wear levelling of the Flash memory. This is 
because the physical addresses in NAND memory are 
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constantly changing to avoid premature damage of Flash 
cells which can only be rewritten a limited number of 
times. 
B. BACKING UP 
Due to the high capacity of the NAND storage it was 
most convenient to use the same type of memory to hold 
the backup copy. For that the same SK hynix 8GB type of 
the NAND chip was desoldered from a non-working 
iPhone 5c board and wired to a connector. Obviously, 
because of the different UID in that iPhone, the chip did 
not operate in the test phone. Nevertheless, iTunes did 
allow us to restore the system to the initial state although 
with a different serial number. However, the iPhone failed 
the activation stage probably because of the changed serial 
number. Nevertheless, this NAND chip was still useful as 
backup storage. 
In order to create the exact backup copy of the NAND 
chip a special test board was built (Figure 18). The core of 
the board is the Microchip PIC24EP512GP806 
microcontroller that has a hardware PMP port capable of 
running at 40MB/s transfer speed for reading and 80MB/s 
for writing [23]. At such throughput it takes about 80 
minutes to copy all the data from the original chip to the 
backup. Unfortunately, the 1:1 backup copy did not work 
in the iPhone 5c. Even the boot Apple logo did not appear 
on the power up. There were some references to hidden 
partitions used in iPhone NAND storage which makes 
cloning a challenging task [24]. 
 
Figure 18.  Test board for copying NAND chips 
The backup copy was then used to restore the data in 
the original NAND chip after several passcode attempts. 
C. RESTORING 
The process of NAND mirroring is relatively simple. 
Once the backup copy is created and verified, the original 
chip is plugged back into the iPhone 5c. After the power 
up, which takes about 35 seconds, we enter the passcode 6 
times. Then the phone is powered down by holding the 
power button and sliding the power off message. It is 
necessary to wait until the power is removed from the 
NAND which takes about 10 seconds. Once the LED 
attached to the NAND goes off it is safe to remove the 
NAND and plug it into the test board. 
Our software that was running on a laptop first scanned 
the areas of the most likely changes in the NAND and 
created a file with checksums. This file was then compared 
against the backup scan. All the changed blocks were then 
erased and all used pages were written back from the 
backup copy (Figure 19). This process takes from 30 to 60 
seconds depending on memory usage. Once the restore is 
completed the test board can be powered off and the 
NAND can be placed back into the phone. 
 
Figure 19.  iPhone 5c NAND mirroring software 
Once the phone is powered up and the screen is slid the 
passcode can be entered six times until the delay of one 
minute is introduced again. Then the process of mirroring 
from backup can be repeated again and again until the 
correct passcode is found. On average each cycle of 
mirroring for six passcode attempts takes 90 seconds. 
Hence, a full scan of all possible 4-digit passcodes will 
take about 40 hours or less than two days. 
It is not easy to describe the whole process in a paper, 
therefore a video of the working proof-of-concept 
demonstration for this NAND mirroring process will be 
placed on the Internet. More information can be found on 
the dedicated iPhone research project page [25]. 
In the presented method the original chip is always 
restored to the initial passcode attempts counter state 
without applying wear levelling. As a result, its Flash 
memory gets worn out. Although NAND chips allow a few 
thousand rewrites, no one knows how many were used 
already. Hence, it could fail before the correct passcode is 
found. Given six attempts per each rewrite this method 
would require at most 1667 rewrites to find a 4-digit 
passcode. For a 6-digit passcode it would require over 160 
thousand rewrites and will very likely damage the Flash 
memory storage. 
From a forensics point of view modifying the original 
NAND storage will be undesirable because this could 
change some vital information in the device. 
D. CLONING 
The process of cloning involves creating a fully 
working copy of the NAND Flash memory chip. However, 
as it was already mentioned in the previous section, simply 
copying the 8GB information from the original chip into 
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another identical chip taken from other iPhone 5c does not 
give the desired result and the iPhone does not boot. 
 
Figure 20.  iPhone 5c hidden pages in NAND memory space 
 
Figure 21.  iPhone 5c waveforms during NAND access 
Some additional research was undertaken to figure out 
why simple copying does not work. For that the same 
model of the NAND Flash chip was programmed with the 
data from the original chip and then the communication 
was analyzed with both an oscilloscope and a logic 
analyzer. First, some pages were accessed from addresses 
outside the normal 16GB space. For example, instead of 
reading and writing to the block 0x00041Axx the CPU 
was accessing the block 0x00841Axx. Although such 
accesses are mapped back into the 0x00041Axx block, the 
page numbers were different as well as the status of those 
pages.  Figure 20 shows status and checksums for the first 
several pages for the blocks 0x00041Axx and 
0x00841Axx. It can be noted that the page 0x00841A02 is 
mapped to 0x00041A03, page 0x00841A03 to 
0x00041A05 and so on. The status of the pages for 
0x00041Axx block was 0x61 in comparison with 0x40 for 
0x00841Axx block. Second, some irregularities were 
found in the communication prior the access to those 
hidden pages (Figure 21). Although the data transfer 
during the access is performed in the SDR mode at 
17MHz, while the configuration commands use even the 
slower speed of about 1MHz, some data inside the 
commands are smuggled at an astonishing rate of 256MB/s 
in DDR3 mode. Also, a dummy value for data bit 7 was 
introduced for the period of 23ns. Given that the data setup 
time in those transfers is less than 1ns there is a very high 
chance that such information would be overlooked by most 
would-be attackers. 
After those findings the implementation of the 
communication protocol was amended in the test board. 
Then the data-mirroring software was modified to include 
cloning the hidden pages. As a result the newly created 
clone of the original NAND chip was fully functional in 
the iPhone 5c. It was then tested with six incorrect 
passcode attempts before replacing it with the original 
chip. After the boot process it was possible to enter the 
incorrect passcodes again six times until the one minute 
delay was introduced. This fully proved the correctness of 
the hardware NAND mirroring attack on iPhone 5c. 
Because there is no limitation on the number of such 
NAND clones, they can be created in advance and restored 
in parallel when one of them is being used for passcode 
testing. This way it only requires 45 seconds per six 
passcode attempts. For 4-digit passcode the maximum 
attack time would be (10000/6) × 45 = 75000 seconds or 
about 20 hours. For 6-digit passcode this time will increase 
to about 3 months which in some cases might be 
acceptable. 
V. IMPLICATIONS 
There are several limitations to the presented methods. 
For attacking real devices some form of automation for the 
process is necessary to avoid mechanically plugging of the 
NAND memory devices into the iPhone. This could be 
achieved either using electrical switches or multiplexers, 
or by emulating the NAND chip, for example, using an 
FPGA. 
Another concern is that the process of removing the 
NAND chip from the main board could damage both the 
main board and the NAND Flash chip. 
Some reliability issues were found in the NAND 
management. When NAND chips from non-working 
iPhone 5c main boards were desoldered and tested, some 
of the chips had bad blocks. Surprisingly, those bad blocks 
were primarily in two address spaces: 0x000BB100 – 
0x000BB1FF and 0x000BD000 – 0x000BD0FF. The same 
addresses were overwritten with different data, while for 
other addresses the overwriting was happening into new 
addresses. The same applies to address spaces 
0x0003B1xx and 0x0003D0xx. This means that the Flash 
wear levelling algorithm was not implemented correctly 
and some addresses are more likely to fail. 
VI. FUTURE WORK 
The iPhone 5c device being analyzed in this research 
project was far from the latest Apple phones. Since then 
several new models were introduced such as iPhone 5s, 
iPhone 6 and 6s, iPhone SE and iPhone 7. However, 
iPhone 5s and 6 use the same type of NAND Flash 
memory devices. It would be logical to test them against 
mirroring. For models from iPhone 6s more sophisticated 
hardware will be required because they use high speed 
serial NAND Flash chips with a PCIe interface. 
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Some improvements to the existing setup could involve 
automating passcode entry and rebooting, for example, by 
using an external USB controller to emulate all the 
necessary functions for passcode entry. 
Having taken this technology to proof-of-concept, it 
would be useful to develop it further by building a fully 
working emulator of the NAND Flash memory chip. This 
would significantly speed up the mirroring process. 
Further improvement could come from finding a way for 
soft restart or placing the iPhone into sleep mode. This 
would save the time otherwise needed for a full boot of the 
iOS. 
It would be beneficial to develop a safer way of 
removing the NAND Flash chip from the main board, or a 
way of reading out the NAND Flash contents without the 
need to physically remove it. The NAND chip has two 
additional pads which might be used to gain access to the 
internal memory contents. Those pads are wired to test 
pads on the main board. This could be a backdoor to the 
NAND data. Of course, there will be a challenge to figure 
out the exact interface and the debugging protocol. One 
possible approach could be in employing advance 
hardware silicon scanning technique presented a few years 
ago [26]. 
The research presented in this paper had a limited 
budget and the time constraints. With a properly funded 
research project and a decent research team the evaluation 
of the NAND storage in mobile devices could be taken to a 
new level. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The research presented in this paper has demonstrated 
the successful hardware mirroring of NAND Flash 
memory in the Apple iPhone 5c. It was possible to bypass 
the passcode retry limit by restoring the original NAND 
data from a previously created backup copy. Then the 
mirroring process was improved by creating a fully 
working clone of the original chip. That way the forensics 
of the original chip are fully preserved and multiple copies 
of the original can be used for brute-forcing the passcode. 
This is the first public demonstration of a working 
prototype and real hardware mirroring for the iPhone 5c. It 
should allow brute-forcing of a 4-digit passcode in less 
than a day. 
There were several obstacles on the way. Although 
Apple did introduce some hardware security 
countermeasures, most of them seem more like security-
through-obscurity rather than fully thought through 
measures. 
The experimental setup presented in this paper could 
also be used as a test platform to evaluate and observe 
NAND memory in real time. This might help in spotting 
not only the hardware security related issues but also some 
reliability issues. For example, it was found that half of the 
NAND chips from non-working iPhone 5c main boards 
had specific blocks failed due to excessive rewriting. This 
might happen because of a bug in Flash memory wear 
levelling algorithm as it was implemented in software. 
There are several ways the presented approach could 
be improved. First, the NAND access can be optimized 
using more efficient hardware and software support. 
Second, the whole process of passcode recovery can be 
automated. Third, instead of using the original chip a 
proper 1:1 clone can be created. Finally, the NAND 
memory storage can be emulated in an FPGA thus 
eliminating the need to waste time rewriting the NAND 
Flash. The last two improvements will be particularly 
useful for forensic applications where the original NAND 
storage must be preserved. Ultimately, the NAND might 
be read without taking it off the main board. That way the 
risk of damaging the data will be minimal. 
Further research should be undertaken to understand 
the risks involved in NAND storage mirroring in other 
mobile devices. 
The mirroring solution presented in this paper was 
achieved using off-the-shelf components bought from an 
electronics distributor with a budget of under 100 dollars. 
The same approach could be applied to the newer models 
of iPhone. The same type of LGA60 NAND chips are used 
up to the iPhone 6 Plus. Any attacker with sufficient 
technical skills could repeat the experiments. Newer 
iPhones will require more sophisticated equipment and 
FPGA test boards. 
In terms of countermeasures against mirroring, several 
approaches can be taken at various levels. At the hardware 
level more robust authentication should be used rather than 
a proprietary interface. At the software level, a challenge-
response authentication could be used to prevent access to 
NAND memory or replay attacks. At the usability level, 
users should use at least 6-digit passcodes, or better 8-
character passcodes. Attacking such passcodes would 
require access to the SoC directly to reduce the waiting 
time between attempts. 
The knowledge of the possibility of mirroring would 
definitely help in designing systems with better protection. 
Despite government comments about feasibility of the 
NAND mirroring for iPhone 5c it was now proved to be 
fully working. 
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